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Abstract 
Following the 1900 congress in Paris, the beginning of the 20th century saw 
comparative law emerge as a significant discipline. This paper suggests that the 
early 21st century is seeing the decline, or maybe even the ‘end’, of comparative 
law.  In  contrast  to  other  claims  which  see  the  21st  century  as  the  ‘era  of 
comparative law’, there are at least four trends which give rise to pessimism: 
‘the  disregard’,  ‘the  complexity’,  ‘the  simplicity’,  and  ‘the  irrelevance’  of 
comparative law. These phenomena will be explained in the body of this paper; 
the concluding part considers suggestions as to how to proceed further. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Following the 1900 congress in Paris, the beginning of the 20
th century saw 
comparative law emerge as a significant discipline.
1 This article suggests that 
the  early  21
st  century  is  seeing  the  decline,  or  maybe  even  the  ‘end’,  of 
comparative law. In contrast to other claims which see the 21
st century as the 
‘era  of  comparative  law’,
2  there  are  at  least  four  trends  which  give  rise  to 
pessimism:  ‘the  disregard’,  ‘the  complexity’,  ‘the  simplicity’,  and  ‘the 
irrelevance’  of  comparative  law.  These  phenomena  will  be  explained  in  the 
body  of  this  article;  the  concluding  part  considers  suggestions  as  to  how  to 
proceed further. 
 
This article is deliberately provocative (and deliberately brief). However, it is 
not  suggested  that  from  now  on  we  should  be  interested  in  national  legal 
systems  only.  Rather  the  opposite.  Its  general  purpose  is  to  reflect  on  the 
methodology of comparative law and the way in which one might respond to 
some its problems. In this respect, it is in line with some of the core themes of 
comparative law: its justification, status, and methodology.
3 
 
II. The Disregard of Comparative Law 
 
The  claim  that  courts  should  disregard  comparative  law  was  recently  most 
clearly expressed by some of the judges of the US Supreme Court. In Lawrence 
v  Texas  Justices  Scalia  and  Thomson  disregarded  all  arguments  based  on 
foreign experiences because ‘this Court [...] should not impose foreign moods, 
fads, or fashions on Americans’.
4 Justice Scalia also referred to the ‘practices of 
the “world community”, whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always 
those of our people’.
5 In another case, Justices Scalia, Thomson, and Renquist 
criticised the use of comparative law as cherry picking: ‘to invoke alien law 
when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned 
decisionmaking’.
6 Similarly, the new Chief Justice Roberts stated during his 
confirmation hearings: ‘In foreign law you can find anything you want. If you 
don’t find it in the decisions of France or Italy, it’s in the decisions of Somalia 
or Japan or Indonesia or wherever’.
7 
 
It should be noted that these statements were reactions to the opinions of the 
other Justices of the Supreme Court, who did make reference to foreign laws,
8  
and  that  the  cases  in  which  these  statements  were  made  concerned  the 
politically sensitive issues of the death penalty and homosexual rights. In other 
cases, it may be less controversial to use arguments from other countries.
9 
   2 
Nonetheless,  the  disregard  of  comparative  insights  is  a  general  feature  of 
contemporary  US  legal  culture.  Various  academics  have  supported  the 
statements of Justices Scalia et al.
10 Furthermore, it has been said that in the US 
‘comparative law is not a very popular subject. In its own estimation the United 
States is the leading country of the world. So why look around?’
11 And it has 
also  been  stated  that  comparative  law  teaching  only  provides  a  ‘superficial 




Moreover,  the  influence  of  comparative  law  in  the  US  academia  is  on  the 
decline. For instance, in the 19
th and early 20
th century continental legal thinking 
exerted  considerable  influence  on  US  law.
13  Yet,  in  the  last  50  years,  that 
influence has waned.  One (admittedly simplistic, but still persuasive) indication 
of  this  can  be  seen  in  the  frequency  of  occurrence  of    ‘droit’,  ‘Recht’  and 
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Note, however, that the use of the term ‘comparative law’ has increased in the 
2000s. It remains to be seen whether this can be regarded as a new trend. Also, a 
numerical approach always has its limits because the meaningfulness of the use 
of a particular word depends on its context.
15 
 
The disregard of comparative law is not limited to the US. To be sure, there is 
some  exchange  of  knowledge  where  there  are  rules  shared  with  other 
countries.
16 In particular, if countries have a common legal language (such as 
most common law countries) it is likely that some similarity among the legal 
systems will be maintained by the use of comparative law. This can also be 
proven empirically.
17 However, these are exceptions. In general, politicians and 
judges  pay  no  attention  to  comparative  law,  because  it  is  regarded  as  too 
complicated and theoretical.
18 Even Sir Basil Markesinis voices the criticism 
that often comparative law is often about ‘ideas and notions that cannot be put 
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to  practical  use,  and  ‘are  likely  to  satisfy  only  those  who  spend  their  time 
devising them and then quoting each other with self-satisfaction’.
19  
 
To elaborate, with respect to legislators, comparative law is often used only to 
deliver  additional  arguments  for  what  has  politically  already  been  decided. 
References  to  small  countries  are  in  any  case  unlikely.
20  With  respect  to 
adjudication, except when considering legal rules with an international element, 
courts rarely use comparative law.
21 In some countries there has even been a 
decline. For instance, in Germany between 1951 and 1974 there was a wave of 
decisions which referred to foreign law, but in recent years there have been far 
fewer references.
22 This reluctance is hardly surprising. Courts often lack the 
knowledge and the time to take comparative arguments into account. And there 
may also be reasons based on national sovereignty,
23 similar to the opinions of 
Justice Scalia and his colleagues. 
 
One might hope that the problem would be less acute in academia. There are 
indeed some positive signs as regards developments in the European Union. For 
instance, the discussion about the Europeanization of private law has led to new 
journals,
24 case books,
25 and case studies
26 about comparative private law.
27 
 
However, in other areas of academic study comparative law has remained an 
esoteric subject which matters only to a few people with special interests.
28 It is 
decreasing in importance and is, at best, an optional subject, even in the EU.
29 
Again,  this  is  no  surprise.  In  most  countries  legal  education  is  focussed  on 
preparing  students  for  legal  practice,  with  the  result  that  legal  academics 
frequently see their task as ‘stamp collecting’:
30 primarily providing an accurate 
and coherent description of the law as it is applied domestically. And as English 
has  become  the  internationally  dominant  language,  non-English  speaking 
materials are less often taken into account. Evidence for this can be found in the 
charts  below  which  show  the  frequency  of  occurrence  of  ‘law’,  ‘droit’  and 
‘Rechtsvergleichung’ (comparative law) in the major German law journal NJW 
(Neue Juristische Wochenschrift) over the last 26 years. For ‘law’ there is no 
clear trend, but ‘droit’ is in a near steady decline.
31 
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However, once again a caveat is necessary. The use of the word 
‘Rechtsvergleichung’ has increased in the years 1995-2005 (whether the 
decrease in the year 2006 is a general trend remains to be seen). 
 
III. The Complexity of Comparative Law 
 
There  is  a  tendency  to  emphasise  the  complexity  of  comparative  law.  Two 
variations  of  this  tendency  can  be  identified,  the  ‘strong’  and  the  ‘weaker’ 
forms. The strong form imposes exaggerated requirements on the practice of 
comparative law, making it virtually impossible. The weaker form does not, but 
despite its merits, it too may discourage comparative research. 
 
A. The Strong Form 
 
The ‘strong form’ emphasises the poverty of the existing comparative literature, 
seen as positivistic, superficial and providing a mere illusion of understanding 
of other legal systems.
32 Instead, what is needed is a deep, interdisciplinary, 
critical,  or  even  post-modern  comparative  law.
33  Meaningful  comparison 
requires  understanding  the  historical,  social,  economic,  political,  cultural, 
religious,  and  psychological  context  of  legal  rules.  In  particular,  different 
mentalities have to be taken into account. Thus, the comparative lawyer has to 
understand  the  cognitive  structure  of  the  law  as  well  as  the  epistemological 
foundations of that cognitive structure.
34 The result of this comparative exercise 
is  that  there  are  deep  ontological  differences  between  legal  systems.
35 
Comparing legal systems is like comparing different ‘world versions’.
36 Every 
legal  system  is  singular.
37  Similarities  are  only  superficial,  convergence 
impossible  and  people  from  different  legal  systems  cannot  understand  each 
other because of irreconcilable differences in mentalities. 
 
The  result  of  this  approach  is  that  comparative  law  becomes  impossible.  A 
perfectionist view of understanding tells you that ‘if you do not fully understand 
something,  you  do  not  understand  anything’.
38  The  comparative  lawyer  is 
therefore  ‘lost’
39  because  the  entire  context,  including  the  ‘epistemological 
foundations  of  the  cognitive  structure’  can  never  be  perfectly  understood. 
Moreover,  even  if  one  could  understand  a  particular  legal  system  perfectly, 
there could be no comparison. An analysis of two legal systems would just have 
two chapters, one written by someone trained in the legal tradition of the first 
country, the other written by someone someone trained in the legal tradition of 
the second country. Since generalisations which apply to both legal systems are 
impossible, comparison is also impossible.
40  
   7 
B. The Weaker Form 
 
The  strong  form  may  appear  quite  radical.  However,  in  a  ‘weaker  form’,  a 
similar view is becoming more and more accepted. Like the strong form, the 
weaker form aims not at reducing, but at multiplying, complexity.
41 Consider 
the following apparently harmless statement: 
 
As Japan belongs to the German legal family, both German and Japanese 
commercial law provide that in case of a sale between traders, the buyer 
shall, upon taking delivery of the subject matter, examine it without delay 
(§ 377 German Commercial Code; § 536 Japanese Commercial Code). 
 
This statement may give rise to various objections, including the following: 
 
1.  There is no consideration of the different business contexts in Germany 
and Japan. This emphasis on context is a general trend. In the US, it has 
existed for many years. As long ago as 1987, Richard Posner announced 
‘the decline of law as an autonomous discipline’.
42 Even if the trend is not 
yet  followed  elsewhere,  context-dependency  has  become  a  frequent 
mantra of comparative lawyers.
43 
 
2.  The  mere  mention  of  legal  rules  may  be  criticised.  Rule-based 
comparisons are bound to be superficial. For instance, it is said that in 
order  to  get  a  deeper  level  of  understanding  about  such  fundamental 
concepts as ‘interpretation’ and ‘contract’, theories and conceptions are 
the most appropriate basis for comparing legal systems.
44 
 
3.  Some scholars emphasise the limits of comparability. In particular, it is 
sometimes said that Western and non-Western countries are too different 
to provide a meaningful comparison:
45 You cannot compare apples and 




4.  The  reference  to  legal  families  may  be  opposed.  On  the  one  hand, 
comparatists increasingly emphasise that law is becoming international, 
transnational, or even global, so that looking at legal families is seen as 
less important.
47 As one scholar puts it: 
 
Is it really the Germans with their Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch versus 
the  Americans  with  their  Uniform  Commercial  Code?  Or  is  it 
rather the Germans and the Americans as members of the United 
Nations  Convention  on  Contracts  for  the  International  Sale  of   8 
Goods (CISG) versus the English who have not ratified it? Or is it 
perhaps  the  Germans  and  English  as  EU  members  (and  thus 
signatories of the Rome Convention) versus the Americans? Or is 
it perhaps all these countries as members of the WTO (and thus 




On the other hand, some scholars claim that all legal systems are mixed to some 
degree. One would therefore have to ‘deconstruct the conventionally labelled 
pattern  of  legal  systems  and  re-construct  them  with  regard  to  parentage, 
relationships  and  the  diverse  fertilisers,  grafting  and  pruning  used  in  their 
development’.
49 This would apply to Japanese law, since its commercial law has 
not only been influenced by German, but also by US, law.
50  
 
Many  modern comparative lawyers would therefore claim that, although the 
sentence above may be correct, it is far too superficial. Thus, for instance, the 
author of a research paper or article submitted to a journal would be asked to 
provide  further  explanations.  Although  this  does  not  make  comparative  law 
impossible, it may discourage it. 
 
To be sure, this result does not mean that the new interdisciplinary and post-
modern approaches to comparative law cannot be valuable. They are indeed a 
useful antidote to the frequent ‘simplicity of comparative law’ (see the next 
part) and can make comparative law intellectually stronger. In particular, the 
concept of legal cultures may be useful to explain complementarities between 
legal and economic institutions.
51 However, the emphasis on the complexity of 
comparative law should not lead to a new ‘elitism’ in which every comparison 
which is primarily interested in differences between legal rules rather than in 
their broader socio-economic context is dismissed out of hand.
52 
 
IV. The Simplicity of Comparative Law 
 
Comparative law is not about summarising every aspect that can be obtained 
about different legal and extralegal systems, but in about making a comparison. 
However,  this  crucial  part  of  a  comparative  exercise  is  often  not  treated 
seriously enough. 
 
A. The Traditional Simplistic Approach 
 
The ‘traditional simplistic approach’ to comparative law is mainly focussed on 
an accurate description of a particular foreign legal system. This translation of 
what  others  have  written  about  their  domestic  law
53  and  accumulating  and   9 
transmitting  knowledge  about  foreign  law  and  legal  families
54  is  not  really 
comparative law.  
 
Examples are legion. First, consider some comparative law journals. It has been 
said that ‘looking through the volumes of the American Journal of Comparative 
Law, one quickly recognizes that (…) the articles about foreign law outnumber 
(often by a huge margin) those explicitly comparing two or more systems’.
55 
Second,  many  books  on  comparative  law  spend  the  bulk  of  their  text  on 
describing  the  laws  of  particular  countries.  In  this  respect  there  is  no 
fundamental differences between books which follow a rule-based and a case-
based approach. For instance, in Part II of Zweigert and Kötz’s Introduction to 
Comparative Law the main aim appears to be to provide an overview of French, 
German, English, and US contract and tort law. The comparative passages seem 
to be mere supplements to this overview.
56 Similarly, the Casebooks for the 
Common Law of Europe
57 are focussed on providing information about different 
legal systems, without offering a fuller picture of the law in action
58 or detailed 
comparative  explanations.  The  congresses  of  the  International  Academy  of 
Comparative Law
59 provide another example. National experts produce detailed 
country reports on particular topics and only a general reporter then draws a 
comparative conclusion from the country reports. Thus – despite the fact that 
for most topics there is already abundant literature available in English – the 
main task of the academics involved is merely the compilation of information. 
Finally,  this  ‘foreign  law  focus’  can  also  be  seen  in  the  self-perception  of 
comparative  lawyers.  Often  they  regard  themselves  not  primarily  as 
comparatists but, for instance, ‘mainly as Asia specialists, Russian law scholars, 
constitutional lawyers with comparative interests, etc’.
60 
 
B. The New Simplicists 
 
A more recent trend is, however, even more simplistic. The traditional approach 
treats the study of foreign legal systems seriously even if it is less interested in 
comparison. In contrast, the ‘new simplicists’ are simplistic in both respects, 
because they treat different legal systems as mere compilations of information 
which can be coded in a numerical way. 
 
The starting point of this quantitative comparative research was an article by La 
Porta  et  al  entitled  ‘Law  and  Finance’.
61  The  authors  coded  the  law  on 
shareholder and creditor protection of 49 countries. For instance, with respect to 
shareholder protection they used eight variables,
62 allocating a country either a 
‘0’ or a ‘1’ for each variable. They then drew on these numbers as independent 
variables  for  statistical  regressions.  Their  main  finding  was  that  good   10 
shareholder protection leads to more dispersed shareholder ownership, which 
can be seen as a proxy for developed capital markets. 
 
Many  subsequent  papers  by  La  Porta  et  al  and  others  have  used  a  similar 
methodology for other areas of law.
63 Moreover, the World Bank has extended 
the La Porta et al research in order to rank all the legal systems in the world in 
terms of their efficiency in fostering business: 
 
Legal Systems Ranked in Terms of Ease of Doing Business 
 
1 New Zealand 
2 Singapore 




7 Hong Kong, China 
8 Denmark 























32 Austria  
33 Namibia  
34 Fiji  
35 Taiwan 
36 Tonga  
37 Slovakia  
38 Saudi Arabia  
39 Samoa  
40 Botswana 
41 Czech Republic  
42 Portugal  
43 Jamaica  
44 France  
45 
Kiribati…………….. 
Note: The rankings for all economies are benchmarked to January 2005 
and reported in the country tables. The ease of doing business averages 





The importance of these studies, and that of the World Bank’s Doing Business 
Report, cannot be underestimated.
65 This line of research is one of the most 
important trends in contemporary comparative legal and economic scholarship. 
For instance, searches with Google and Westlaw show result in many times 
more hits for La Porta et al than for Zweigert and Kötz.
66 The La Porta et al 
studies  have  also  had  an  immense  impact  in  academic  fields  such  as 
comparative corporate governance:
67 For instance, the EU Commission’s impact 
assessment on the Directive on Shareholders’ Rights explicitly referred to them 
in order to justify their recent reform.
68 In contrast to traditional comparative   11 
law
69 these studies also have a considerable political impact. The World Bank 
uses  its  numerical  benchmarks  of  legal  rules  in  order  to  put  pressure  on 
developing and transition economies, which often depend on the World Bank’s 
funding. Developed countries also take the Doing Business Report seriously. In 
the  United  Kingdom  the  mainstream  media  has  contained  reports  about  it.
70 
France’s ranking (44., below Namibia’s (33) and Botswana’s (40)), has led to a 
hefty counter-reaction. The French government has set up its own programme 
on the ‘Attractivité économique du droit’,
71 and a French group of academics 
has produced a 144-page report which challenges the World Bank’s result.
72 
 
There  are  indeed  major  problems  with  this  methodology,  which  make,  for 
instance, the World Bank’s ranking entirely useless. The first line of problems is 
that the legal indices of La Porta et al and their successors do not provide an 
accurate numerical description of the law of different countries. For instance, 
with  respect  to  La  Porta  et  al’s  article  on  shareholder  protection,  numerous 
coding  errors  have  been  identified.
73  Furthermore,  eight  is  a  very  limited 
number of variables, and can hardly provide a meaningful picture of the legal 
protection of shareholders. The choice of variables has also been criticised. It 
not  only  suffers  from  an  US  bias  but  is  also  a  poor  proxy  for  shareholder 
protection in general, because the variables do not capture the most significant 
aspects of the law.
74 Secondly, the World Bank’s ranking suffers from the fact 
that  it  puts  together  countries  in  which  the  context  of  particular  rules  is 
completely different. For instance, Taiwan, Tonga, Slovakia and Saudi Arabia 
may  rank  similarly  (ranks  34-38)  but,  given  the  differences  between  these 
countries, this does not tell us anything about these legal systems. A convincing 
– quantitative or qualitative – comparative exercise would look quite different.
75 
 
V. The Irrelevance of Comparative Law 
 
A major interest of traditional comparative law is the comparison of laws of 
different countries. Two factors make this endeavour less interesting.  
 
A. Harmonisation and Convergence 
 
If the laws of two countries are identical, comparative law is pointless. To be 
sure, some academics
76 vehemently deny that legal convergence is taking place: 
It  is  said  that  convergence  is  only  superficial  because,  taking  into  account 
deeper structures, major differences continue to exist. For instance, civil law 
and  common  law  are  even  today  marked  by  such  oppositions  as  deductive 
versus inductive, logical and  systematic versus pragmatic, rule-bound versus 
fact-bound, future-oriented versus past-oriented, and so forth. For comparative 
law, accordingly, legal norms should be treated not as value-free rules but as   12 
fitting into the differing mentalities of the legal systems. From this there also 
follows the impossibility of ‘legal transplants’. Even formally identical rules are 
differently interpreted and applied in different legal systems, not surviving the 
journey from one legal system to another unchanged. Sometimes the transfer of 
a legal rule from one country to another is also called a ‘legal irritant’, which 
means that this transfer does not lead to convergence but triggers a whole series 
of new and unexpected events.
77 
 
These convergence critics are correct in saying that even within the European 
Union it is not realistic that the entirety of law (statutory law, case law, legal 
practice, and legal culture) is becoming identical. However, this does not mean 
that there can be no convergence. Convergence does not call for identity. Thus, 
even if, for example, differences in legal culture persist and transfers of legal 
rules do not lead to identity, there can still be ‘convergence’. In particular, there 
is  no  denying  the  fact  that  in  the  EU  the  laws  of  the  Member  States  are 
becoming more similar in many areas (but, of course, not identical). Although, 
for instance, the European Directives on company law only provide minimum 
harmonisation, leave many gaps, and may be applied differently,
78 they have at 
least  reduced  some  differences  among  Member  States.  Thus,  for  instance, 
although one can still compare the different rules on the mandatory bid, the 
Takeover Directive now excludes the situation in which the law of a Member 
State does not provide a mandatory bid at all.
79  
 
The suggestion that on a global scale laws are becoming more similar is even 
more controversial.
80 However, at least in the field of commercial law, clear 
convergence forces can be identified. On the one hand, there is ‘convergence 
through congruence’
81 because, as the social, political and economic conditions 
that form the background to the law come closer together internationally, the 
law itself also grows more similar. On the other hand, there is ‘convergence 
through  pressure’  because  across-countries  interest  groups  press  for  an 
approximation of laws.
82 For shareholder protection convergence has also been 
demonstrated empirically.
83 The consequence is that to some extent comparative 
law  becomes  fruitless.  Ironically,  this  is  also  fostered  by  comparatists 
themselves because their spreading of knowledge about different legal systems 
reduces path dependencies which would have hindered convergence.
84 
 
B. The Evolving Legal Framework 
 
Harmonisation  and  convergence  ‘only’  make  it  less  interesting  to  compare 
national laws. The even bigger challenge is that the configuration of the legal 
framework itself is changing. For instance, it is said that ‘state-based law in the 
traditional  sense  becomes  a  component  in  a  complex  network  of  national,   13 
transnational and international private and public norms’.
85 Thus, one needs to 
study the relationship among these different types of regulations. A new type of 
conflict of laws and not primarily comparative law may therefore be crucial in 
order to understand the legal systems of the world.  
 
Furthermore,  new  law  making  procedures  make  it  difficult  to  focus  just  on 
national statutory and case law. This is one of the main themes of the debate on 
future  ‘global  governance’.  On  a  formal  level  ‘governance’  (in  contrast  to 
‘government’)  means  that  instead  of  mandatory,  hierarchical  legal  norms, 
innovative  regulatory  philosophies,  such  as  soft  law  and  more  co-operative 
forms of lawmaking, are used.
86 Examples include codes of conduct for national 
and multinational corporations.
87 Substantively, the focus on ‘governance’ also 
challenges comparative lawyers. In the sense of ‘good governance’ it means that 
even in times of globalisation public goods like a stable, fair world financial 
system,  a  minimum  of  social  justice  and  an  intact  environment  must  be 
ensured.
88  This  ‘politisation’  of  the  law  can  be  regarded  as  alien  to  the 
comparative lawyer, who denies ‘easy solutions or political ambitions’, whose 
project is one of ‘comprehension rather than governance’, and who is ‘the last 
honest  man’,  whose  ‘goal  is  understanding  or  contributing  to  a  broadly 
humanist understanding of a universal phenomenon called “law”’.
89 
 
These  challenges  mean  that  comparative  lawyers  have  to  rethink  their 
methodology, and in particular their relationship to international law, soft law 
and politics. The last section will give some pointers as to how this might be 
done.  
 
VI. Between Scylla and Charybdis 
 
In the Odyssey, Odysseus had to choose whether to sail the side of the channel 
overlooked by the six-headed monster Scylla, or the other side where there was 
the enormous whirlpool Charybdis.
90 Similarly, it can be wondered how can 
comparative law escape its dangers. The first option may be to return ‘back 
home’ to the roots of comparative law. However, this is hardly feasible in view 
of  the  changes  in  the  legal  landscape.
91  It  would  also  be  unfortunate  to 
eliminate,  for  instance,  the  innovations  of  the  new  interdisciplinary  and 
quantitative approaches to comparative law.
92 
 
Second,  one  may  choose  the  ‘open  sea’  where  ‘anything  goes’.  This 
methodological relativism is not foreign to comparative law. It is frequently said 
that comparative law has no fixed working method,
93 that its methodology is 
‘still at the experimental stage’, and that there is ‘very little systematic writing 
about the methods of comparative law’.
94 However, this is also unsatisfactory,   14 
because reflection about one’s own methodology – which necessarily leads to 
the  conclusion  that  some  things  are  not  appropriate
95  –  is  one  of  the 
preconditions for a serious field of research.  
 
Third,  one  might  try  to  find  an  appropriate  ‘harbour’.  It  has  already  been 
suggested  that  ‘a  sound  theoretical  canon  of  comparative  law’  should  be 
established.
96 Such an agreement of the comparative law community is entirely 
unrealistic. And as the canon would probably be developed by the very scholars 
who control the existing institutions of comparative law, it would also stifle 
innovation. 
 
In my view, the compromise solution is to look for ‘rivers’. This means that 
there can be different approaches to comparative law research depending on its 
aim and the personal preferences and expertise of the researcher. This would 
channel the research and could also show what does not work in a particular 
field.
97  It  would  also  keep  the  tolerance  of  a  diversity  of  approaches  to 
comparative  law.  Of  course,  exchanges  and  mergers  of  these  different 
approaches – ‘rivers flowing together’ – are also possible. 
 
Finally,  it  does  not  really  matter  whether  these  approaches  are  still  called 
comparative law. For instance, Patrick Glenn did not feel it necessary to include 
the term ‘comparative law’ in the title or the preface of his award-winning book 
on ‘Legal Traditions of the World’.
98 And although it has been suggested that 
the new quantitative methodology
99 be called ‘numerical comparative law’,
100 it 
is perhaps no coincidence that the supporters of this methodology prefer the title 





There is a need to reflect the purpose and methodology of comparative law. 
This is based on a number of reasons.  
 
Comparative law is often disregarded. This is particularly striking in the US, but 
it is also a general phenomenon, and this article has presented some empirical 
evidence. Of course, there is no complete disregard and some recent trends may 
provide  hope.  In  particular,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  discussion  about  the 
Europeanization of private law has led to an increasing interest in comparative 
private law. 
 
There is a trend to emphasise the complexity of comparative law. In its strong 
form this view almost makes comparative law impossible. More common is the   15 
weaker  form,  which  emphasises,  for  instance,  the  importance  of  the  socio-
economic context for a comparative research. This has its merits. However, it 
may have the side-effect of discouraging comparative research. 
 
The simplicity of comparative law is, on the one hand, an old phenomenon. This 
‘traditional simplistic approach’ to comparative law is mainly focussed on an 
accurate description of a particular foreign legal system, which is not really 
comparative  law.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  recent  trend  to  apply  a 
quantitative  methodology  to  comparative  law.  This  can  have  its  merits. 
However, most of the quantitative comparative research disregards the problems 
which a reduction of complexity by numbers entail. 
 
A major interest of traditional comparative law is the comparison of laws of 
different countries. Thus, as far as legal systems are converging, comparative 
law  becomes  pointless.  To  be  sure,  even  within  the  European  Union  legal 
systems  will  not  become  identical.  As  convergence  does  not  mean  identity, 
some convergence will, however, reduce the relevance of comparative law. This 
is also fostered by the fact that new forms of governance and the importance of 
politics challenge the traditional method of comparison. 
 
There are different ways in which comparative law can be pursued. However, 
this does not mean that ‘anything goes’. This article has identified some of the 
problems of contemporary comparative law. Thus, there a need to reflect about 
the  methodology  of  comparative  law  and  its  relationship  to  related  areas  of 
research.
101 
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Number of articles in the Harvard Law Review containing 
 words indicating consideration of comparative law 
Years  droit  Recht   comparative law 
1950-1959  42  16  45 
1960-1969  36  19  37 
1970-1979  19  10  16 
1980-1989  9  6  16 
1990-1999  14  9  13 
2000-2010 
(Projection 
using the data 
for 2000- 6)  9  3 
41 
 
Number of articles in the NJW containing 
 words indicating consideration of comparative law 
Years  law  droit  Rechtsvergle
ichung 
Total number 
of pages in 
NJW 
1981-1985  112  49  68  2960 (1983) 
1986-1990  197  63  80  3288 (1988) 
1991-1995  137  48  67  3352 (1993) 
1996-2000  198  47  103  3800 (1998) 
2001-2005  231  44  128  3800 (2003) 
2006-2010 
(Projection 
using the data 
for 2006) 
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Hypothetical calculation if identical page number per year in NJW 





1981-1985  144  63  87  3800 
1986-1990  228  73  92  3800 
1991-1995  155  54  72  3800 
1996-2000  198  47  103  3800  
2001-2005  231  44  128  3800 
2006-2010 
(Projection 
using the data 
for 2006) 
225  30  90  3800 
 
 
 